We shall not espouse either pietism, scepticism, or criticism. We have merely to consider the individual phenomena, as they may concern the criminalist; to examine them and to establish whatever value the material may have for him; what portions may be of use to him in the interest of discovering the truth; and where the dangers may lurk that menace him. And just as we are aware that the comprehension of the fundamental concepts of the exact sciences is not to be derived from their methodology, so we must keep clearly in mind that the truth which we criminalists have to attain can not be constructed out of the _formal_ correctness of the content presented us. We are in duty bound to render it _materially_ correct. But that is to be achieved only if we are acquainted with principles of psychology, and know how to make them serve our purposes. For our problem, the oft-quoted epigram of Bailey's, ``The study of physiology is as repugnant to the psychologist as that of acoustics to the composer,'' no longer holds. We are not poets, we are investigators. If we are to do our work properly, we must base it completely upon modern psycho physical fundamentals. Whoever expects unaided to find the right thing at the right moment is in the position of the individual who didn't know whether he could play the violin because he had not yet tried. We must gather wisdom while we are not required to use it; when the time for use arrives, the time for harvest is over.
Let this be our fundamental principle: _That we criminalists receive from our main source, the witnesses, many more inferences than observations_, and that this fact is the basis of so many mistakes in our work. Again and again we are taught, in the deposition of evidence, that only facts as plain sense-perceptions should be presented; that inference is the judge's affair. But we only appear to obey this principle; actually, most of what we note as fact and sense-perception, is nothing but a more or less justified judgment, which though presented in the honestest belief, still
offers no positive truth. ``Amicus Plato, sed magis amica Veritas.''
There is no doubt that there is an increasing, and for us jurists, a not unimportant demand for the study of psychology in its bearing on our profession. But it must be served. The spirited Abb
 R. Gneist: Aphorismen zur Reform des Rechtestudiums. Berlin 1887.
 A. Menger: in Archiv fin soziale Gesetzgebung v. Braun II.
 A. St
 S. Goldschmidt: Rechtestudium und Priifungsordnung. Stuttgart 1887.
Now let us for once frankly confess why we are dealt these disgraceful reproaches. Let us agree that we have not studied or dealt with jurisprudence as a science, have never envisaged it as an empirical discipline; that the aprioristic and classical tradition had kept this insight at a distance, and that where investigation and effort toward the recognition of the true is lacking, there lacks everything of the least scientific importance. To be scientifically legitimate, we need first of all the installation of the disciplines of research which shall have direct relationships with our proper task. In this way only can we attain that spiritual independence by means of spiritual freedom, which Goldschmidt defines as the affair of the higher institutions of learning, and which is also the ideal of our own business in life. And this task is not too great. ``Life is movement,'' cried Alois von Brinz, in his magnificent inaugural address. ``Life is not the thought, but the thinking which comes in the fullness of action.''